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Kurtz: Kurtz: Employment of Criminal-Record

Comments
EMPLOYMENT OF "CRJMLNAL-RECORD-VICTIMS"
IN MISSOURI: RESTRICTIONS AND REMEDIES
"Liberation is not deliverance. A convict may leave the galleys
behind, but not his condemnation."
Victor Hugo, Les Miserables*
I.

INTRODUCHON

A criminal record's perpetual existence "victimizes" its holder with
many lifelong burdens,' but none are as potentially devastating as the
impaired ability to obtain employment. The record made of an arrest,
charge, prosecution, probation, conviction, incarceration, or parole may
seal the fate of the job applicant in both the public and private sectors,

regardless of his behavior since the event and his actual ability to perform the work. This regrettable situation is at cross-purposes with every
reformative expectation that society has for the holders of criminal records. This comment will document the plight of these persons, here designated "criminal-record-victims," when they seek employment in Missouri.
It will not explain how employers can legitimately exclude persons with
criminal records, but rather will consider how criminal-record-victims
become included within the ranks of the employed through legal challenges to unreasonable restrictions on their employment. Two recurrent
themes are that they can only overcome restrictions that are truly unreasonable, and that their relative indigence makes the more expensive remedies
less available to them. The subject is analyzed by describing the persons
involved, discussing the employment restrictions imposed, and delineating
the remedies available to these aggrieved holders of criminal records.
A. Who Are The "Criminal-Record-Fictims"?
The individuals who may receive "the life sentence of [a] stigmatic
record"-2 include not only the "guilty," but also those who have at any
time had a record-generating experience with any segment of the criminal

justice system, regardless of whether it resulted in prosecution or conviction.3 These people can be appropriately designated "criminal-record01. V. HUGo, Lrs MisriaER .zs 98 (C. Wilbour transl. 1862).
1. For an exhaustive study of the history and nature of civil disabilities, including restrictions on voting, legal, judicial, and property rights as well as denial
of employment, see The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. Rnv. 929 (1970).
2. A. NUSSBAUIm, A SECOND CHANcE: AmNEsTY FOR Tnm FiRsr OFFENDER 99
(1974).
3. The most recent and tragic example of an innocent person's suffering in
this way is reported in Paul v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4437 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
After the individual was arrested on a shoplifting charge, his photograph and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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victims" because of the effect that such records have on their employment
future. The number of criminal-record-victims is astonishingly large. In
1974 alone there were an estimated 9,055,800 arrests made in the United
States.4 It is reported.that the total number of Americans with some form
of criminal record is over 50 million.5 Furthermore, every indication is that
the frequency of the statistics-producing events is steadily on the rise.
Criminal cases filed in the circuit courts of Missouri increased at. the rate
of 16 to 17 percent during both 1974 and 1975.6 The ranks ofMissouri's
criminal-record-victims appear to be large and ever-growing. Their criminal
records are widely available to the general public and to private companies, 7 and are frequently the basis for summary exclusion from employment consideration.
At least two characteristics of the criminal-record-victim population
are crucial to an understanding of the problems involved. 'Fifst, the
heaviest burdens uridoubtedly fall upon those who have had*the d6eper
involvements with the criminal justice system. In Missouri, these would
include such persons as the 2,017 prisoners incarcerated at the' Missouri
State Penitentiary in May, 1975, 8 and the 60,900 inmates held in Missouri's
134 jails during an average year. 9 The second characteristic is thii' 66rtain
social groups are disproportionately represented among crimiial.'recordvictims. An estimated 50 to 90 percent of males in poveriy ateas have
criminal records.' 0 Black Americans over 18 years of age are"'approximately five times more likely to have been arrested than whites.11 These
name appeared in a police-prepared and -distributed flyer of "active shoplifters."
Even after the charge was dismissed, the Supreme Court held that this Action did
not deprive the individual of any "liberty" or "property" rights protected 'by the
fourteenth amendment.
4.

FEDERAL

BUREAU

OF

INVESTIGATION,

UNIFORM

CRIME

Rno

s-,-1974,

Table 28 at 179 (1975).
5. Note, Eiiployment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L.Q. 306 (1970).
6. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT OF MIssouRI, ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STATxs'ricAL REPORT 29 (1975). Data are for July 1-June 30 fiscal years.
. 7. Police departments are routinely the major suppliers of criminal record
information for the general public and private companies. The St. Louis Board
of Police Commissioners recently announced that it "will make haailable an
arrest register for a period of up to thirty days from the date of arrest, even
though no charge has been filed against the individual involved." St..LQuis Board
of Police Commissioners, Press Release (Mar. 18, 1976). The Kansas City Police
Department will also provide arrest information to private companies, buit only for
arrests that have resulted in a conviction. Kansas City Police Department, Confidentiality of Computerized Information (1976). Conviction information is generally released to any company or individual.
•
8. Letter .from.: George M. Camp, Deputy Director, Missouri Department
of Social Services to Deverne Calloway, Missouri State Representative,, Jply 21,
1975.
9.- MISSOURI ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE, SURVEYING MISSOURI'S
JAILS Table 1 at 6 (1974).
110; PRESIDENTtS COMMISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTIcE, THm CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967).
I11.

UNITED STATES COMisISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE...BY

ALL Ti PEOPLE 48 (1969).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/9
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data attest to the following cogent description of a typical criminal-recordvictim:
...

disproportionately male; from black or other racial or ethnic

minority; under 25 years of age; unmarried; without a high school
education; lacking in employment skills and experience; and stemming from broken homes with working mothers. He comes from
a ghetto background which breeds crime and is characterized by
inadequate housing, broken families, deteriorated neighborhoods,
dilapidated and ineffective schools, unemployment and rampant
drug use.... Poverty contrasted with economic affluence creates
frustration and desires which can frequently only be satisfied by
crime.' 2
B. The Social Dysfunctions of Restrictions on
Criminal-Record-Victim Employment

The belief that employment is essential to the offender's successful
reintegration into society was held by such mid-nineteenth-century correctional reformers as John Augustus. 13 The relationship has' now been
empirically demonstrated in careful criminological studies' 4 and judicially
noticed by several courts.15 After fifteen years of action and research in
the area, the Vera Institute of Justice has concluded that "employment is
not only necessary for rehabilitation, but the process of employment itself
with its discipline and associated learning process is an important part of
the rehabilitative process."' 16 This body of belief and knowledge makes the
statistical reports that unemployment rates among criminal-record-victims
7
are often over four times as high as the rates for the general population'
all the more disturbing.
It has recently become stylish for scholars to scoff at the "mythology
u8
regarding the effectiveness of [correctional] treatment in any form.'

Too few are recognizing that legal and not-so-legal impediments to a
criminal-record-victim's subsequent employment may be making inordinate
contributions to that ineffectiveness and to the consequential high 'rate of
recidivism among criminal-record-victims. These impediments effectively
prevent untold thousands of Missouri criminal-record-victims from adopting, or returning to, meaningful and law-abiding ways of life. The same
restrictions thereby impose on Missouri citizens the unhappy burdens of
increased crime and higher criminal justice system costs. Individuals bear12. NATIONAL
(September, 1974).

ALLIANCE OF BUsINEssMEN,

Ex-OFFENDER PROGRAM UPDATE

4

13. PRESIDENT'S COMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 2-4 (1967).
14. D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYsTEM 329

(1964).

15. See, e.g., Miller v. District of Columbia Bd. of Licenses, 294 A.2d 365,
370 (D.C. App. 1972).

16.

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED C.J.C.C.-V.E.R.A. SupproRTIvE EM-

PLOYMENT PROGRAM FOR Ex.-ADDIcTs AND EX-OFFENDERS

11 (1975).

17. G. POWNALL, EMPLOYMENT PROBLFMS OF RELEASED PRISONERS (1969).
18. J. WILSON, THINUNG AsoUr CRIME 170 (1975). See also D. LnrYoN, R.
MARTINSON, J. WILES, Tm EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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ing the less serious criminal records, such as arrests or probations, may become more serious criminal-record-victims if their records prevent their
being gainfully employed. Almost 98 percent of this state's most serious
criminal-record-victims-the inmates of the Missouri Department of Corrections-will eventually be released to their home communities.' 9 If
they cannot find employment the most severe social dysfunction may well
be the resultant learning of illegal income-gathering techniques by the
entire family. More than just the one criminal-record-victim will thus be
lost to society, as the cycle may well produce a strange twentieth-century
version of "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children's children,
unto the third and fourth generation." 20
The social dysfunctions of employment discrimination against criminalrecord-victims are many. Because the human and social costs involved are
great, there is need for study and reform in this area.
II.

RESTRICONS ON CRIMINAL-RECORD-VICTIMa

EMPLOYMENT IN MISSOURI

A. State Restrictions
The Missouri constitution provides that persons convicted of felonies
or crimes connected with voting may be excluded by law from voting.21 It
then limits the offices of representative, 2- senator,2 3 and judge to qualified voters. 2 4 In addition, all elective executive officials of the state and
judges of the supreme, appellate, and circuit courts are liable to impeachment for "crimes, misconduct, . . . or any offense involving moral turpitude ...."25 These provisions are obviously of little concern to the typical
criminal-record-victim described above, for the employment he seeks is almost never political or judicial office. A more relevant state constitutional
provision is the one giving the head of each executive department the discretion to "select and remove all appointees in the department except as
otherwise provided in this constitution, or by law." 26 The steady expansion
of the state merit system has largely limited this discretion. Thus, the Missouri constitution itself does not provide major affirmative impediments
to the employment of criminal-record-victims in Missouri.
Missouri statutes, however, contain a vast array of general disabilities
and specific restrictions on the hiring and retention of criminal-record19. MIssouI DEPARTMENT OF CoRREcrioNs, ANNUAL STATUS REPORT 31 (July
1, 1974).
20. Exodus 34:7.
21. Mo. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2.
22. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, § 4.
23. Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 6.
24. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25. Interestingly, the governor and other executive
officers of Missouri are not subject to this "qualified voter" requirement. Id. at
art. IV, §§ 3, 10, 13.
25. Mo. CONsT. art. VII, § 1. Removal, suspension, and discipline powers
concerning other judicial officers' commissions of the same transgressions are
vested in a commission on retirement, removal, and discipline of judges. Id. at
art. V, § 27.
26. Mo. CoNsr. art. IV, § 19.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/9
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victims. These include the temporary and permanent loss of voting rights
for certain offenses, 27 forfeiture of "all public offices [of] trust, authority
and power" upon being sentenced to a state institution,2 8 and permanent
disqualification from "holding any office of honor, trust or profit" for
conviction of certain offenses. 29 The reach of these provisions has not been
tested in Missouri. From Louisiana, however, comes the sad tale of a
school bus driver who had been convicted of breaking and entering in
1937, but who had an unblemished record since that time, including his
1952-1961 employment by the school board.3 0 He was nevertheless dismissed when the board learned of his offense 24 years after it occurred.
The Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal on the basis of a
statutory provision against employing any persons with "criminal records" in "positions of trust or profit." 3' The corresponding provisions of
Missouri statutes, if similarly interpreted, would significantly limit the
employment opportunities of criminal-record-victims in Missouri.
Professional licensing is another area where state statutes restrict the
employment of criminal-record-victims. There are more than seven million
jobs in the nation potentially affected by laws on limited licensing
33
for persons with criminal records.32 In Missouri over 40 occupations
34
and more than 218,000 persons are subject to the control of state occupational licensing authorities. The Young Lawyers Section of the Missouri Bar recently compiled a list of 41 occupations and professions from
which criminal-record-victims can be excluded due to statutory licensing
restrictions based on their criminal record rather than any personalized
review of their individual abilities.3 5 Even that listing fails to exhaust the
27. §§ 111.060, 559.470, 560.610, RSMo 1969.
28. § 222.010, RSMo 1969.
29. § 559.470, RSMo 1969. See also § 560.610, RSMo 1969.
30. Thomas v. Evangeline Parish School Bd., 138 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1962).
31.

Id. See Bromberger, Rehabilitation and Occupational Licensing, 13 Wm.

:MARY L. Rv. 794, 800-01 (1972).
32. J. HUNT, J. BowERs, N. MILLRa, LAws, LcENsFs AND THE OFrENDE'S
RIGHT To WoRx 4, 8 (1974). This publication by the National Clearinghouse on
Offender Employment Restrictions provides, at Appendix A, an exhaustive list

of "Statutory Conditions Affecting the Licensing of Ex-Offenders" for 307 occupations in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
33. YOUNG LAwyms" SECTION OF Tim Missouai BAR, EMPLoYMENT REsricTIONS ON Ex-OFFENDERS (1975).

34. Special Project, Fair Treatment of the Licensed Professional: The Ad-

ministrative Hearing Commission, 37 Mo. L. Rav. 410 (1972).
35. Young Lawyers' Section, supra note 32, at 11-15. The occupations are:
accountant (§ 326.060, RSMo 1969), alcohol manufacturer or seller (§ 311.060,

RSMo

1969),

alcohol

transporter

(§

311.420 (2),

RSMo

1969),

architect

(§§ 327.131, 327.151, 327.441, RSMo 1969), attorneys at law (§ 484.040, RSMo
1969, and Missouri Supreme Court Rule 8), barber (§§ 328.080, 328.127, RSMo

1969), chiropodist (§§ 330.030, 330.160, RSMo 1969), chiropractor
RSMo 1969), cosmetologist

(§ 331.030,

(§§ 329.050, 329.060, RSMo 1969), dental hygienist

(§§ 332.331, 332.410, RSMo 1969), dentist (§§ 332.131, 332.321, 332.331, RSMo
1969), drivers and chauffeurs

(§ 302.060, RSMo 1969), embalmer

(§§ 3.33.041,

333.121, RSMo 1969), engineer (§§ 327.221, 327.441, RSMo 1969), funeral director (§§ 333.041, 333.121, RSMo 1969), hairdresser (§ 329.050 (1), RSMo 1969),
industrial commission, member (§ 286.020, RSMo 1969), insurance agent

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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areas of statutorily restricted licensing.36 The present restrictions generally
do not consider the relationship between the offense and the work, the
length of time since the conviction, and the post-conviction experience.

These--statutes generally provide for license denials based upon specific
criminal offenses, offenses involving "moral turpitude," or the absence of
"good moral character." Missouri courts have construed "moral turpitude"
so broadly as to include "all acts done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty
or good morals." 3 7 Empirical research in a variety of jurisdictions has
shown that the "moral turpitude" standard is so vague that it can indude almost any offense,38 and that the "good moral character" requirement has been applied almost exclusively to criminal-record-victims.3 9 The licensing authority may even base a denial on an alleged
violation despite the individual's subsequent acquittal. 40 Licensing statutes
are generally justified by the state's power to protect the public's health,
safety, morals, and welfare.4 1 As now written and interpreted, however,
they constitute immense barriers to criminal-record-victims seeking employment in a licensed field.
Criminal-record-victims seeking employment with state governments
themselves are often summarily excluded under authority conferred by
statute.4 2 Missouri statutes on the state merit system grant the following
authorization:
Subject to the regulations, the director may reject the application

of any person for admission to an examination or may strike the
(§§ 875.018, 875.091, 875.141, RSMo 1969), insurance broker (§§ 875.091, 375.141,
RSMo 1969), hearing aids: fitters and dealers (§§ 346.055, 846.105, RSMo 1969),
land surveyor (§§ 327.311, 827.331, 827.441, RSMo 1969), liquor control agent
RSMo 1969),
(3 811.620, RSMo 1969), liquor control supervisor (311.610,
liquor wholesalers (§812.040, RSMo 1969), manicurist (3 329.050, RSMo 1969),
manufacturer, distributor or dispenser (§ 195.040, RSMo 1969), nursing home
administrator (§§ 838.055, 844.030, RSMo 1969), nursing home license (3 198.120,
RSMo 1969), optometrist (§§ 336.030 (2), 336.110, RSMo 1969), osteopath (3 334.100,
RSMo 1969), pharmacist (§§ 338.050, 338.055, RSMo 1969), physician/surgeon
(§§ 334.100, 334.590, RSMo 1969), practical nurse (§ 835.060, RSMo 1969), professional physical therapist (§§ 334.530, 334.590, RSMo 1969), reader for the blind
(§209.030, RSMo 1969), real estate agent (§§ 339.110, 339.040, RSMo 1969), securities dealer/salesman (§ 409,150, RSMo 1969), security broker (3 409.204,
RSMo 1969), speech pathologist and clinical audiologist (§§ 345.050, 845.065, RSMo
1969), tavern owner: liquor license (§811.480, RSMo 1969), teacher (3 168.081,
RSMo 1969), veterinarian (§§ 540.060, 340.140, RSMo 1969).
36. See, e.g., §§ 325.080, 325.035, RSMo 1973 Supp. (the statutes on licensing
of public adjusters and adjuster solicitors).
37. Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 896, 897, 177 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo. En Banc
1944). See also In re Burrus, 258 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Mo. En Banc 1953); In re
McNeese, 346 Mo. 425, 427, 142 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Mo. En Banc 1940).
38., J. HUNT, supra note 32, at 7.
39. Ohanesian, Restoration of Rights to Felons in California, 2 PACInG L.J.
718 (1971).
40. Crooms v. Ketchum, 379 S.W.2d 580, 587 (Mo. 1964).
41. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1899).
42. For a general analysis of restrictions on governmental employment, see
H. MmLER, THE CLOSED DOOR: THE EFFECT OF

A CRIM.INAL

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/9
MENT WITH STATE AND LOCAL Putsuc AGENcIEs (1972).
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name of any person from a register or refuse to certify the name of
any person on a register for a position or withdraw the certification
of such a person if he finds that such person... has been convicted
of a crime or guilty of any notoriously disgraceful conduct .. .
The language grants even greater discretion for summary action against
criminal-record-victims than do most of the licensing statutes. The Missouri Division of Personnel asks every applicant for a state job this
question: "Have you ever been convicted of any law violation or are you
now under charges for any offense other than minor traffic violation?" 44
At stake are approximately 68,000 jobs with the state government.45
The myriad "regulations" of licensing boards, the Division of Personnel, and other state agencies may either exacerbate or mitigate the limitations discussed above. Their effect is largely unknown at present due to
their relative unavailability. The imminent creation of the Missouri
Register and the Code of State Administrative Regulations 46 should
make these administrative guidelines available for review. Unfortunately,
they will most likely be found to contain still further state-imposed
restrictions on criminal-record-victim employment in Missouri.
B. Local and Federal Restrictions
L6cal government ordinances generally include some restrictions very
similar to those contained in the state statutes. 4 For example, the personnel director of Kansas City has the broad authority to make and
amend rules on the rejection of job candidates due to defects in "moral
character." 48 Similar obstacles may confront the criminal-record-victim

seeking one of the almost 175,000 jobs available in Missouri local government.49
The federal government also has a major impact on criminal-recordvictims seeking work in Missouri. For example, a federal statute prohibits
persons convicted of certain offenses from working for a bank insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 50 Department of Defense
regulations bar many former offenders from government contract work
through, security clearance restrictions. 51 The federal government itself
directly provides over 67,000 jobs in Missouri. 52 The President of the
United States has directed the Civil Service Commission to prevent
43. § 36.180, RSMo 1969.
44. Brief for Appellee at 36, Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 523 F.2d
1290 (8th Cir. 1975).

45.

UNrrE STATES DETvr. OF COMMERCE, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN

8 at 16 (1975).
46. See § 536.015, RSMo 1973 Supp.
47. H. MILLER, supra note 42, at 37.

48. CrrY OF KANsAS CrrY, MissouPa CHARTER Part V,

§ 116 (3) (1967).

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN

1974, Table

UNITED STATES DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN

1974, Table

49. UNrITE STATES DEPT. OF CoMMERCE,
8 at 16 (1975).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (1970).
51. 32 C.F.R. § 155.5, 156 (1970).
52.

1974, Table

8 Published
at 12 (1975).
by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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federal employers from unjustly discriminating against criminal-recordvictims.5 3 Nevertheless, the Commission's most recent "suitability disqualifications" still grant rather broad discretion to refuse to give an examination to an applicant, to deny an appointment to an eligible applicant,
and to remove an appointee on the basis of "criminal, dishonest, infamous
or notoriously disgraceful conduct."5 4 Finally, there are certain express
disqualifications from federal employment, such as for persons convicted
of participation in certain riots56 and of advocating the overthrow or
destruction of the United States government. 6
C. Private Sector Restrictions
The strongest, although least demonstrable, limitations on the employment of criminal-record-victims are probably those generated by the
private sector. Criminal-record-victims face a widely-recognized, antagonistic network of "informal pressures." 57 In New York City, 311 of 475 po-

tential employers stated that they would never hire a released offender. 5
Approximately 75 percent of the employment agencies contacted in another
study refuse to refer any applicant with an arrest record, regardless of
whether the arrest was followed by conviction. 9 Furthermore, most employers willing to hire criminal-record-victims will consider them only for
relatively unskilled work. 0 Bonding requirements provide an additional
barrier, because many bonding companies both demand that their
clients avoid hiring criminal-record-victims and explicitly refuse to bond
such persons. 6 ' There is usually no consideration given to whether a rational connection exists between the offense and the job and to whether
behavior since the offense indicates any sort of personal reformation.
A criminal record may also preclude membership in labor unions
or apprenticeship programs. 62 It was not until the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that Congress acted to assure the right of admission to unions on
a broad basis. Even then, the right was extended only to those denied
such membership because of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 0 3
The Landrum-Griffin Act prohibits certain felons from serving as of53. June 19, 1975 CONG. REc. S 11021.
54. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, § 731.202 (b) (2) (July 3, 1975).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 7313 (1970).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970). The employment bar resulting from this
treasonous crime lasts for only five years. This seems ironic when compared to
the permanent bars created by Missouri statutes for many less serious offenses.
See text accompanying notes 35, 36, and 43 supra.
57. THE PRSIarNr'S COxzMr'N

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINISTRATION

OF

JusncE, supra note 10, at 169.
58. Note, supra note 5, at 307.

59. Id.
60. Meltsner, Caplan, and Lane, An Act to Promote the Rehabilitation of
Criminal Offenders in the State of New York, 24 SYLukcusE L. Rrv. 885, 890 (1973).
61. Id. at 892.
62. H. MiLLER, supra note 42, at 51.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/9
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e)-2 (c) (1970).

8

Kurtz: Kurtz: Employment of Criminal-Record
CRIMINAL-RECORD-VICTIMS

1976]

ficers or directors of labor unions, 64 and affects many more persons than
just the organized crime figures it was designed to exclude. Finally, many
labor contracts expressly permit the employer to discriminate against
65
criminal-record-victims in hiring and discharge policies.

III.

REMEDIES FOR UNREASONABLE

CRIMINAL-RECORD-VICTIMm

ESTRICTIONS ON

EMPLOYMENT IN MISSOURI

It has been shown that today's criminal-record-victim faces a veritable
maze of state, local, and federal governmental restrictions on his employment opportunities, as well as greater barriers in the private sector. Many
of the limitations may be reasonable and justifiable, but far too many
are not. Some are arbitrary and capricious. It is this latter group of restrictions which the criminal-record-victim can hope to challenge successfully. The challenges may take the form of attempts to eliminate the
criminal record itself, or of efforts to limit the effect through administrative, judicial, or legislative action.
A. Remedies for Governmental Retention of Certain Criminal Records
The victimizing effects of criminal records are lessened where the
records themselves are subject to destruction under appropriate circumstances.6 6 Missouri does not have an extensive statutory scheme pertaining to the retention of criminal records. The one major statute on the
subject authorizes the "Bertillon signatelic card system" for accumulation
and dissemination of felony records. 67 These and other records made by
criminal justice officials are destroyed only in very rare instances. The
ways to challenge their continued existence are limited to certain specific
situations.
Missouri does have a statute allowing record destruction after a
juvenile offender's seventeenth birthday.68 It is based on the belief that
the youth should be freed from the lifelong taint caused by a delinquency
record. The statute, however, provides for only partial destruction of
juvenile records, and even that provision is directory rather than mandatory. The "social histories, records, and information" which can be destroyed still expressly exclude "the official court file," 69 so that "the
statute leaves untouched the essential adjudication of status. '70 A motion
by the court, the youngster, or the juvenile officer and a court finding of
64. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (a) (1970).
65. See generally Kovarsky, Civil Rights and Arbitration, 1974 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 59.
66. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972).
67. § 222.050, RSMo 1969. The statute provides that the person may be subjected to "the measurements, processes, and operations" used in the identification of
criminals.
68. § 211.821 (8), RSMo 1969.
69. Id.
70. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult
Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 177-78.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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the child's best interest are required to be made before the court
"may... enter an order to destroy." 71 Although the statute is more narrow
than is generally recognized, a criminal-record-victim is well-advised to
make full use of what record destruction it does allow.
Special consideration for the effects of a criminal record on young
persons is also reflected in a recent Missouri statute which provides for
the expungement of criminal records for persons not over 21 years of age
72
who are placed on probation for certain minor narcotics violations.
The statute describes the mandated expungement in absolute terms, sets
simple criteria based on probation and post-probation behavior, and directs that the court "shall enter" the order if the criteria are met. Of perhaps greatest significance is the provision that the individual will never be
liable for failure to disclose his criminal justice encounter. This immunity
can be crucial to the criminal-record-victim seeking employment.
Unfortunately, the relief this statute was designed to provide for
the young criminal-record-victim has been diminished by two recent cases.
The Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Kraus73 held that an applicant
cannot file his application for expungement until after his probationary
period has ended. Only the lone dissenter interpreted the statute with a
view to its purpose and its desired effect on the criminal-record-victim:
I do not believe it is consistent with the remedial purpose behind
Sec. 195.290 to interpret it so that a youthful offender with a
good post-conviction record may have to wait anywhere from one
to five years before he can obtain the relief of having his conviction expunged. By that time his chance of rehabilitation, higher
education, useful employment, normal living and the opportunity
to be a part of society free from the stigma of conviction may have
passed. If the remedy is going to do him any good as a youthful
offender, it must come soon. I think that is what the legislature
had in mind and that the court of appeals was correct in holding
that the application could be made and acted upon any time
after
74
the first six months of the probationary period has passed.
71. § 211.321 (3), RSMo 1969.
72. Section 195.290, RSMo 1973 Supp. provides in part:
After a period of not less than six months from the time that an offender
was placed on probation by a court, such person, who at the time of the
offense was twenty-one years of age or younger, may apply to the court
which sentenced him for an order to expunge from all official records...
all recordations of his arrest, trial and conviction. If the court determines.., that such person during the period of such probation and during the period of time prior to his application to the court under this
section has not been guilty of any offenses, or repeated violation of the
conditions of such probation, he shall enter such order. The effect of
such order shall be to restore such person, in the contemplation of the law,
to the status he occupied prior to such arrest and conviction. No person
as to whom such order has been entered shall be held thereafter under any
provision of any law to be guilty of perjury or otherwise giving a false
statement by reason of his failures to recite or acknowledge such arrest

or trial or conviction in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
73. 530 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
74. Id. at 689 (Seiler, C.J., dissenting).
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Some judges have refused to destroy the records, with one judge even
deeming it proper merely to place "a record in his safe to prevent it from
being made available to the public." 7 5 The Attorney General of Missouri
counseled against this practice by declaring that the requirement of "expungement" could only be met by the "physical destruction of the records."78 In State ex rel. M.B. v. Brown77 the St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals directly contradicted the Attorney General's advice
on the meaning of "expungement." It held that the statute "does not
call for destruction or annihilation of the records themselves" and that the
legislature intended only the striking out of that part of the record which
identifies it with the offender. 8
These decisions do not totally emasculate the statute, but it is clear
that judicial interpretation has thus far construed this remedial piece of
legislation so as to limit the remedy available to the criminal-record-victim.

Nevertheless, the eligible criminal-record-victim should once again avail
himself of whatever relief the statute can yield.

Missouri's new "sunshine law" on governmental meetingsT 9 contains
some supplemental provisions of great potential importance to criminalrecord-victims.8 0 These sections call for the "closing" of arrest and detention
records where there has been a delay in charging and for the "expungement"
of those closed records when there has been a failure to convict.8 1 There is
also a required "closing" of official records when an arrestee's case is
subsequently nolle prossed, dismissed, or concluded by a not guilty finding.8 2 Finally, the statute grants immunity for failure to acknowledge
closed or expunged records.8 3 The Attorney General has issued strict ad75. 31 Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 111 (Feb. 4, 1974).
76. Id. The Attorney General stated that the word "expunge" in this statute
should be taken as meaning "not a legal act, but a physical annihilation."

77. 532 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
78. Id. at 896.
79. Ch. 610, RSMo 1973 Supp.

80. The statute has already withstood a challenge based upon the rule against
two subjects in one bill, as found in article III, section 23, of the Missouri constitution. See Cohen v. Poelker, 520 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
81. Section 610.100, RSMo 1973 Supp., provides:
If any person is arrested and not charged with an offense against the law
within thirty days of his arrest, all records of the arrest and of any detention or confinement incident thereto shall thereafter be dosed records to
all persons except the person arrested. If there is no conviction within
one year after the records are dosed, all records of the arrest and of any

detention or confinement incident thereto shall be expunged in any city
or county having a population of five hundred thousand or more.
82. Section 610.105, RSMo 1973 Supp., provides:
If the person arrested is charged but the case is subsequently nolle
prossed, dismissed or the accused is found not guilty in the court in which
the action is prosecuted, official records pertaining to the case shall thereafter be closed records to all persons except the person arrested or charged.
83. Section 610.110, RSMo 1973 Supp., provides:
No person as to whom such records have become dosed records or as to
whom such records have been expunged shall thereafter, under any provision of law, be held to be guilty of perjury or otherwise of giving a false
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visory guidelines for "closing records," 8 4 and has once again defined "expunge" to require "physical destruction."8 5 In view of State v. KraussO
and State ex rel. M.B. v. Brown,8 7 however, this definition will probably
not be followed. The statute itself is very limited, with "expungement" being available only in a specific circumstance and then only in a city or
county having a population of 500,000 or more. Also, "dosing" is an extremely imprecise concept at best. It is again desirable, of course, for the
criminal-record-victim to take advantage of whatever remedies are available to remove the burden of his record. Furthermore, it is only through
greater and more regular use of these provisions that there can be hope
for more expansive interpretations.
Missouri does not have statutes making the expungement remedy
more broadly available to criminal-record-victims in general. Such comprehensive statutes have been urged by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 8s and have recently been
enacted in several states.89 Legislation in other nations, such as Japan and
the Soviet Union, contain some of the more far-reaching provisions for the
expungement of criminal records. 90 The fundamental issue is whether our
social policy should continue to sanction the infliction of permanent
stigmata upon most criminal-record-victims and to allow only very limited
means of removal. The extent of relief provided elsewhere demonstrates
the limitations on opportunities now available in Missouri for the criminalrecord-victim seeking record expungement, and the nature of his employstatement by reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge such arrest or
trial in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
84. 31 Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 109 (Mar. 25, 1974).
85. 30 Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 299 (Sept. 28, 1973).
86. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
88.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND GOALS,

5.5 at 129-30 (1973). The relief
involved in comprehensive statutes is variously referred to as expungement, record
sealing, record destruction, obliteration, setting aside of conviction, annulment of
conviction, nullification of conviction, and amnesty. The acts done to the records
vary accordingly, with even the basic term "expungement" being subject to many
interpretations.
89. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (e) (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West
COMMUNITY CRME PREVENTION Recommendation

Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332 (i) (Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-2604 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973); MICH. CoMr.
LAws ANN. § 780.622 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.166 (Supp. 1976); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 179.245 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 164-28 (1971); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.32 (C) (Page 1976); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 42.12 § 7 (1966); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.240 (1961). Two of

these statutes are carefully reviewed in Klinge, Expungement of Criminal Convictions in Kansas, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 93 (1974), and Comment, Expungement in Ohio:
Assimilation into Society for the Former Criminal,8 AKRON L. REv. 480 (1975).
90. See PENAL CODE OF JAPAN, art. 34-2, 2 E.H.S. LAw BULL. 10 (Ministry of

Justice transl.); RSFSR CRIM. CODE art. 57, in BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 173-75 (1966). See also Cough, The Expungement

of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147,
162-63 n.72.
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ment dilemma argues for a much more sweeping statutory authorization
for freeing the individual from the millstone of a criminal record. 91
Criminal-record-victims should be aware that under certain circumstances they may have an equitable cause of action for record expungement.
Federal courts have so held:
The judicial remedy of expungement is inherent and is not dependent on express statutory provision, and it exists to vindicate
substantial rights provided by statute as well as by organic law.9 2
The principle is well established that a court may order the expungement of records, including arrest records, when that remedy
is necessary
and appropriate in order to preserve basic legal
9
ights. 3

Similar recognitions have been made by several state courts. 94 Most of
these cases are limited to the expungement of arrest records where the individual was not subsequently convicted, and some require a showing that
the arrest was not based on probable cause.9 6 Equitable actions to remove
records naturally necessitate a demonstration that there is no adequate
remedy at law. 96 The decisions typically turn on a balancing of society's
interests in record retention against the criminal-record-victim's showing of
infringed rights.9 7

Missouri case law on such "equitable expungement" is scarce. 98 In
State ex Tel. Reed v. Harris99 the criminal-record-victim was seeking to enjoin the police from disseminating his arrest record. The state contended
that no such cause of action exists in Missouri, but the court refused to
"hold... that a cause of action cannot be stated."' 00 Although the court
91. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has proposed a model
"Act to Authorize Courts to Annul a Record of Conviction for Certain Purposes.'
See A.BA., COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGsLATIoN AND STANDARDS
V-19 (2d ed. 1975).
92. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This conclusion

was particularly important in view of the lengthy history of this controversial case.
Id., remanding with instructionssub. nom. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 71.8
(D.D.C. 1971), remanded with instructions, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
93. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

880 (1973). See also Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969).

94. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972); Spock v. District
of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14 (D.C. App. 1971); Doe v. Commander, Wheaton Police

Department, 273 Md. 262, 329 A.2d 35 (1974); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334,
487 P.2d 211 (1971).
95. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
96. Haine, Police Records of Arrest: A Brief for the Right to Remove Them
from Police Files, 17 ST. L.U.L.J. 263, 269, 274 (1972).
97. E.g., the presumption of innocence, due process, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, the right to privacy, and generally the penumbras of the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights "formed by emanations from these guarantees. that help give them life and substance." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965).
98. Expungement in Missouri is briefly discussed in Note, Expungement v.
Retention of Arrest Records, 41 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 106, 115-16 (1972).
99. 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. En Banc 1941).
100. Id. at 433, 153 S.W.2d at 837.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 9
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

in Cissell v. Brostron'0 found against a plaintiff seeking similar relief,
the case turned on two evidentiary questions: "[D]id the retention
of ... records by the police department interfere with respondent's pursuit of employment to his damage, and was respondent denied employment
by reason of such retention . . . [?],,1o2 The court thus implied that a
plaintiff meeting those proof requirements would be granted relief. The

relief, however, would not be timely because the criminal-record-victim is
entitled to a court order only after he suffers the employment-related
detriment. The deserving criminal-record-victim needs a way to be freed
from the weight of his record before incurring such a detriment. Furthermore, the equitable orders involved in the Missouri cases would only enjoin dissemination and would not provide any form of expungement.
Therefore, this remedy is a particularly unpromising one for the criminalrecord-victim seeking relief in Missouri. Criminal procedure in Missouri
seems to offer some potential criminal-record-victims the opportunity to
avoid a "conviction," that most damaging of all criminal records, even
though there has been an ascertainment of guilt by verdict or plea. Jurisdictions vary widely on what constitutes a conviction,1 03 but the consistent Missouri interpretation has been that pronouncing judgment and
imposing sentence are necessary before there can be a conviction.1 04 Therefore, a criminal defendant can be spared an actual conviction through
such means as probation prior to sentencing or suspended
imposition of
sentence. 10 5 A defendant who can emerge from his criminal justice experience without a "conviction"' is much less likely to suffer the employment
problems he might otherwise encounter as a result of that experience.
There is one federal law which can provide some assistance for young
persons convicted of a federal criminal violation. If they are between 18
and 26 years of age, they are eligible for sentencing under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act.' 00 The Act provides that upon the youth's discharge from a correctional institution or from probation "the conviction
shall be automatically set aside" and there shall be issued "to the youth
offender a certificate to that effect."' 07 This has been construed to require an "expungement,"' 0 8 so it can be very helpful in avoiding future
employment problems. Indeed, a major purpose of the "set aside" ,provision
was "to help [the offender] and keep him from having to be turned
down by a prospective employer because of the fact that he had had a

101. 395 S.W.2d 322 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
102. Id. at 325-26..
103. 24 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 1556 (2) (1961).
104. See State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1970); Neibling v. Terry, 352
Mo. 396, 177 S.W.2d 502 (1944); State v. Townley, 147 Mo. 205, 48 S.W. 833 (1898);
Meyer v. Missouri Real Estate Commission, 183 S.W.2d 342 (K.C. Mo. App. 1944).
105. State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359, 360-62 (Mo. 1970).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 5005-26 (1970).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1970).
108. Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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conviction." 109 Unfortunately, the actual experience once again seems to
be one of consistently thwarting that purpose.110
The total picture for the criminal-record-victim in Missouri seeking
remedies for governmental retention of the records themselves is thus a
relatively bleak one. This review lends some support to the conclusion
that "expungement statutes are so riddled with legislative and case law
exceptions that they are almost wholly ineffectual.""' Criminal-recordvictims and their advocates generally do not have the financial resources
to undertake litigation aimed at getting more favorable interpretations.
The Missouri expungement statutes apply in only a very limited number
of situations, and there is essentially no Missouri authority for a meaningful "equitable expungement." Until this state's laws do provide a general
right to expungement for deserving criminal-record-victims, 1 2 many of
these people will continue to suffer major unemployment and underemployment problems, and the citizens of Missouri will continue to suffer higher
than necessary recidivism rates and criminal justice system costs.1 1 3
B. Administrative Remedies
Administrative remedies would seem to be the most appropriate
means by which an individual criminal-record-victim can seek relief from
unreasonable employment restrictions. The criminal-record-victims who
suffer the most from such restrictions are very often so destitute that they
cannot retain a lawyer. Furthermore, adjudicatory relief is too infrequent,
and too meager when granted, for many lawyers to be interested in undertaking such litigation. Certain forms of administrative relief can be obtained without. an attorney's services, and most forms require less extensive legal representation than do court actions. It is logical, therefore, that
unemployed and underemployed criminal-record-victims would look to
administrative processes for possible assistance in overcoming employers'
unreasonable restrictions. The most basic administrative remedy of use
to the criminal-record-victim should be the right to challenge any inaccuracies in his criminal records. Kansas officials recently issued a lucid
declaration of the individual's right to access, review, and challenge his
criminal history records." 4 The person is explicitly entitled to an initial
decision by the head of the agency holding the records. If that decision is
109. Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 70 (1949).
110. See Schaefer, The Federal Youth CorrectionsAct: The Purposes and Uses
of Vacating the Conviction, 39 FED. PROBATION 31 (1975).
111. Comment, CriminalRecords of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement from
the Public Access, 3 CALIF. WEus'. L. REv. 121, 125 (1967).
112. For reference to an excellent model expungement statute, see note 91
supra.
113. A very cogent article has been written on the ethical questions regarding
expungement statutes. Kogon & Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal
Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CRum. L.C. & P.S. 378 (1970). Those questions should
be addressed and resolved in the drafting of any such legislation.
114. Kansas Bureau of Investigation, Press Release (March 16, 1976).
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adverse, it can be appealed to the Attorney General; and judicial relief
is still available if the appeal is denied. If the challenge is anywhere sustained, the record-keeper is required to make the needed change, inform
other criminal justice agencies possessing the information of the correction,
and provide the individual with a list of non-criminal justice agencies
known to have received the original information. A similarly specific
administrative delineation of rights should be issued in Missouri.
The oldest form of relief for restoring civil rights to the criminalrecord-victim is the pardon, an administrative procedure authorized in 49
states. 115 The Missouri constitution gives to the governor the power to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons "upon such conditions and
1 He is
with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper.""O
statutorily empowered to appoint a "board of inquiry" to investigate
clemency requests.1 17 But all applications must be referred to the Missouri
Board of Probation and Parole."18 The Missouri statutes provide that only
a gubernatorial pardon may remove a convicted person's disabilities regarding jury duty, voting, and holding any office of honor, profit or
trust. 19 However, there are also provisions for the automatic restoration
"to all the rights and privileges of citizenship" for absolutely discharged
probationers or parolees'120 and for a first-time felon who has been discharged from detention and not been involved in any further crime for
two years or who has been discharged from parole.' 2' The first such form
of automatic restoration has been held to be an express exception to the
122
gubernatorial pardon requirement.
The criminal-record-victim's employment outlook is certainly brightened by pardons and automatic restorations, at least to the extent of making him eligible to hold positions of honor, profit, or trust. Nevertheless,
these forms of executive relief have only limited effects when compared to
other forms of relief, such as expungement. They remit punishment and
remove some disabilities, but they do not affect the legal event determinative of the criminal status, the conviction itself.' 2 3 Furthermore, the pardon power is to be strictly construed so that it can extend only to state
criminal offenses, and not to municipal ordinance violations' 2 4 or license
revocations based on some misbehavior. 26 A pardon can nonetheless be
115. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS, REMOVING OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRicTIONS 42d ed. 1973).

116. Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 7. See also § 549.010, RSMo 1969.
117. § 552.070, RSMo 1969.
118. § 549.241, RSMo 1969.
119. § 222.030, RSMo 1969. For the statutory provisions regarding the loss
of a convict's civil rights, see notes 20-29 and accompanying text supra.
120. § 549.111, RSMo 1969.

121. § 216.355, RSMo 1969.
122. State ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt, 247 S.W.2d 969, 973-74 (Mo. En Banc 1952).
123. See Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
124. State ex rel. City of Kansas City v. Renick, 157 Mo. 292, 57 S.W. 713 (Mo.
En Banc 1900).
125. Theoror v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 527 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. En Baic '1975).
See also Hughes v. State Bd. of Health, 348 Mo. 1236, 159 S.W.2d 277 (1942).
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used to reinstate a license applicant's eligibility where the criminal record
is shown to be the sole reason for denying the application.'21 In general,
however, the pardon is not an effective means for improving a criminalrecord-victim's employment possibilities because an employer can look behind the pardon to the criminal record.' 2 7 The automatic restoration
statutes are of potentially greater benefit to the criminal-record-victim.
The automatic nature of this relief avoids the necessity of legal costs, and
is thus responsive to the indigence of most criminal-record-victims. Missouri's current statutes in this area do not affect the criminal record itself,
however, so that significant broadening of both the automatic restoration
and pardon powers is dearly needed.
Criminal-record-victims aggrieved by the decisions of licensing authorities have historically had few effective remedies or ways to challenge
the decisions. 128 In 1965 the Missouri General Assembly created the Administrative Hearing Commission' 2 9 in order to give greater procedural
protection to occupational licensees. The Commission has authority to
conduct hearings and make findings of fact and conclusions of law on
all questions involving the issuance, revocation, suspension, or probation
of certain occupational licenses.' 3 0 An aggrieved applicant or licensee can
appeal to the Commission from the final decisions of 15 different licensing
agencies,' 3 1 and will be granted a hearing conducted in accordance with
the Missouri Administrative Procedure and Review Act.132 This carefully structured procedure has already generated several favorable determinations for criminal-record-victims. The most noteworthy of these
took place when the Commission reversed a decision by the State Board of
126. Damiano v. Burge, 481 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).

127. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction
of Crime, 8 CiurE AND DELINQUENCY 97 (1962).
128. Tepper & Feinstein, Attacking Barriers to Employment in PRisoNER's
RIGHTS SOURCEROoK 217, 219-20 (M. Hermann and M. Haft ed. 1973). An excel-

lent commentary on state laws restricting the occupational licensing of former
offenders is contained in J. HUNT, J. BowERS, AND N. MILLER, LAws, LICENSES, AND
THE OmuNxR's RIGHT TO WoRK (1974).

129. §§ 161.252-.342, RSMo 1969. See Special Project, Fair Treatment for the
Licensed Professional:The MissouriAdministrative Hearing Commission, 37 Mo. L.

Rrv. 410 (1972).
130. § 161.272, RSMo 1969.
131. The statute gives the Commission authority over licensing decisions by

the following agencies: Missouri State Board of Accountancy, State Board of
Registration for Architects and Professional Engineers, State Board of Barber Examiners, State Board of Cosmetology, State Board of Chiropody and Podiatry,
State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, Missouri Dental Board, State Board of
Embalmers and Funeral Directors, State Board of Registration for the Healing
Arts, Division of Insurance, State Board of Nursing, State Board of Optometry,
Board of Pharmacy, Missouri Real Estate Commission, and Missouri Veterinary
Medical Board. § 161.272, RSMo 1969. The Commission's rules state that it has
jurisdiction over four additional agencies: Department of Agriculture, Division of
Mental Health, Missouri Board of Nursing Home Administrators, and Commissioner of Securities. Mo. AD mN. HEARING Commn. RULE 1.00 (3) (1975); 11 V.A.M.S.

§ 161.342 (Supp. 1976).

132. § 536.100, RSMo 1969.
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Registration for the Healing Arts and ordered that Dr. Bernard Finch, a
t 3
convicted murderer, be permitted to take a licensing examination. 8
The Commission found favorably for Dr. Finch's "rehabilitation" and
"good moral character" and concluded that the Board's determination had
been "unreasonable, arbitrary, and

. . .

an

abuse of discretion."'134 The

court opinion upholding the Commission added an important procedural
clarification: "Now, under the Administrative Hearing Commission Act,
if the board determines to deny the application, the hearing on qualification is to be held by the administrative hearing commission, on complaint
of the applicant."13 5 The Act thus vested authority in the Commission to
conduct an evidentiary hearing in regard to the seriousness of the alleged
criminal conduct, the extent of repentence and rehabilitation, and all
other factors bearing on license eligibility. 136 This interpretation of the
Commission's powers was reaffirmed in State Board of Registration for the
37
Healing Arts v. De Vore.'

The Administrative Hearing Commission's existence and authority has
thus proven to be of substantial benefit to criminal-record-victims with
licensing grievances. It must be pointed out, however, that the doctorlicensees in these two cases were not typical criminal-record-victims in
terms of their wealth, and were therefore able to retain highly capable
attorneys' 38 and to present most impressive arrays of evidence.1 9 The Administrative Hearing Commission is a "second-level" administrative process,
a stage at which the indigence of most criminal-record-victims significantly
reduces their ability to present their cases. Another limitation exists in the
fact that several licensing authorities are not subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction and procedures. 140 The procedural rights accorded applicants
before these omitted licensing bodies are far less comprehensive, 14 ' and
the administrator's discretion is much broader before being subject to
judicial review.'42 These aggrieved applicants have no further administrative relief, and therefore they are limited to the even more expensive
judicial remedies. The Administrative Hearing Commission's proceedings
should be within the economic reach of criminal-record-victims and should
133. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Finch, 514 S.W.2d 608,
610 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
134. Id. at 612.
135. Id. at 613.
136. Id. at 615.
137. 517 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).

138. 517 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); 514 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Mo.
App. D.K.C. 1974).

139. 517 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975); 514 S.W.2d 608 611 (Mo.
App., D.K.C 1974).
140. E.g., Division of Liquor Control (Department of Public Safety), State
Board of Law Examiners, Council for Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters, Division
of Motor Vehicle and Licensing (Department of Revenue), Division of Insurance
(Department of Consumer Affairs, Regulation, and Licensing), Commissioner of
Securities (Secretary of State), Division of Urban and Teacher Education (re:
"teacher certification;" Department of Elementary and Secondary Education).
141. See, e.g., Peppermint Lounge, Inc. v. Wright, 498 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1973).
142. See, e.g., Kehr v. Garrett, 512 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
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extend to more licensing authorities if their full potential value to criminalrecord-victims is to be realized.
Federal civil rights legislation has created some administrative relief
for certain criminal-record-victims. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,143 a comprehensive prohibition against racial discrimination in
employment. The EEOC is mandated to seek compliance with the Act
through conciliation and persuasion. 4 4 If those methods fail, it may bring
a civil action or, if a governmental agency is involved, it may have the
Attorney General instigate a suit. 145 Employment discrimination based on
a criminal record may violate the fair employment practices contained in
Title VII. The reason is that the high arrest and conviction rates for
minority group members will mean that hiring policies giving undue
weight to criminal records will result in rejections for a substantially
disproportionate percentage of minorities. The EEOC has consequently
held that employment polices based upon an individual's criminal record
are inherently intimidating 146 and constitute unlawful discrimination
against blacks as a class.' 47 The drawing of arbitrary conclusions from the
fact of a criminal record is expressly rejected. 148 The "business necessity"
justification requires a showing that "the particular circumstances of each
case-e.g., the time, nature and number of the convictions and .the employee's past employment record, indicate that employment of that particular person for a particular job is manifestly inconsistent with the safe
and efficient operation of that job."'14 9 The EEOC's expansive interpretation of the Act and its history of strong holdings in the area of criminal
records hiring policy make it an excellent administrative resource for the
criminal-record-victim who is also a member of a minority group protected
by the Act.
Several state and local counterparts of the EEOC have been very active in the area of criminal record discrimination related to employment,' 50
but this has not been the experience in Missouri. The Missouri Commission on Human Rights' 5' is the administrative agency charged with enforcing the State Fair Employment Practices Act.' 5 2 That statute prohibits
discrimination based on "race, creed, color, religion, national origin, sex
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 (e) to (e)-15 (1970).
144. Id. § 2000 (e);5 (a),.,
145. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4 (a) (Mar. 24, 1972).
146. EEOC decision 74-25, 10 F.E.P. 260 (1973).
147. EEOC decision F4 02, 6 F.E.P. 830 (1973). See also EEOC decision 7408, 6 F.E.P. 467 (1973); EEOC decision 74-90, 8 F.E.P. 430 (1974); EEOC decision
71-2682, 4 F.E.P. 25 (1971); EEOC decision 72-1497 (Mar. 30, 1972).
148. EEOC decision 73-0257, 5 F.E.P. 963 (1972).
149. EEOC decision 72-1460, 4 F.E.P. 718 (1972). See also EEOC decision

74-89, 8 F.E.P. 431 (1971).
150. The effective activities of state and local human rights commissions are de-

scribed in Comment, The Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Prisoners,26 HASTINGs L.J. 1403, 1428-30 (1975).
151. See § 213.202, RSMo 1969.
152. Ch. 296, RSMo 1969.
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or ancestry,"1 53 and has provisions for complaints, hearings, and decisions. 154 This forum and format are well-suited to the indigent criminalrecord-victim experiencing employment problems, but the Commission unfortunately has not taken the aggressive approach of its federal and some
state counterparts in this area. 55 Despite similarly broad local authorizations, such as those in Kansas City 5 6 and Columbia,157 there is no indication that local human rights commissions in Missouri are giving favorable consideration to complaints by aggrieved criminal-record-victims. In
view of the fact that the EEOC has found the relationship between
criminal record discrimination and racial discrimination to be very dose,
it is regrettable that criminal-record-victims cannot find relief with more
state and local agencies. Again, the only possible way to open up that approach is to file greater numbers of meritorious claims with those bodies.
Labor arbitration has benefited some criminal-record-victims who
were discharged when their employer learned of their prior criminal record. Arbitration clauses are contained in over 90 percent of all collective
bargaining contracts,15 8 and anti-racial discrimination clauses are present
in 46 percent of the contracts. 59 Clauses relating to criminal records are
rarely found, so the discharged criminal-record-victim's challenge centers
on whether the employer had "just cause" under the agreement for discharging the employee. Critical considerations seem to be whether the
event represented by the criminal record is material to the job 0 and
whether it has an adverse impact on the company.16' A clear advantage of
proceeding by way of arbitration is that the aggrieved criminal-record-victim is not required to incur the expense of retaining a lawyer. The disadvantages include the individual employee's third-party beneficiary
status, his usual lack of "standing" to bring arbitration on his own, and
his being subject to discrimination by labor as well as management in
many situations. 162 Thus, a prerequisite to the effective use of the arbi153. § 296.020 (1), RSMo 1969.

154. § 296.040, RSMo 1969.

155. See MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTs, ANNUAL REPORT 1973-74
(1975). None of the 664 employment complaints handled by the Commission during this report-year was related to criminal records. Id. at 11.
156. ADMIN. CODE OF THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI (Aug. 31, 1970
Supp.) declares it to be an "unlawful employment practice" to discriminate on the
basis of "race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, national origin or because such individual is between forty and sixty-two years of age." Id. at § 26.222 (a).
157. The Columbia Commission on Human Rights and Community Relations is empowered to investigate complaints of "racial, religious and ethnic group
COLUMBIA REV.
tension, prejudice, intolerance, bigotry and discrimination.
ORD. § 2.1330 (3) (a) (1971).
158. Comment, The Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1403, 1407 n.23 (1975).
159. Beaird, Racial Discrimination in Employment: Rights and Remedies, 6
GA. L. REv. 469, 478 (1972).
160. 'See Dart Industries, Inc., 56 L.A. 799 (1971).

161. See Crutcher Resources Corp., 61 L.A. 758 (1973). This case involved a
crime committed after the person had been hired.
162. Comment, The Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1403, 1407 n.23 (1975).
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tration process by the criminal-record-victim is the enthusiastic advocacy
of the union representative.
There are, then, several administrative agencies and procedures available in Missouri to aid the criminal-record-victim. The relief they can
provide is economically the most feasible and logically the most preferable.
Still, these remedies could be of greater benefit to the criminal-recordvictim if they were more comprehensive in coverage, more simple in procedure, and more sweeping in effect. Such revisions may come through
subsequent litigation, but they are more likely to be achieved through
new legislation.
C. Judicial Remedies
Criminal-record-victims may seek judicial relief based upon alleged
violations of the United States Constitution or the Missouri constitution

or any of the federal civil rights acts. The extensive litigation in these
areas has generally focused on whether the employment restrictions involved bear a direct relationship or rational connection to job performance.
This basic test has been consistently applied regardless of whether the
cause of action was constitutional or statutory.
Constitutional challenges in the area of criminal-record-victim employment are available only where the restrictions are government-sanctioned because of the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth
amendment. 163 The foremost substantive obstacle to these challenges has
been the view that government-related employment is not a right but a
privilege, 0 4 a distinction that the Supreme Court has now expressly rejected.' 65 The restrictions are now subject to constitutional attack on the
basis of the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses and the eighth amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment.
The first due process argument is that some laws impermissibly create
conclusive presumptions of the unfitness of criminal-record-victims to perform various functions. This contravenes the proposition that "a statute
creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to
66
rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The Supreme Court has recently struck down such presumptions in several
areas,1 67 and at least one United States court of appeals has specifically
163. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
164. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. Rlv. 1439, 1454-55 (1968).
165. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
166. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932).
167. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (presumption against pregnant teachers' working); Viandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)
(presumption against students' resident status); United States Dept. of Ag. v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (presumption against certain households' eligibility
for food stamps); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption against
fitness of fathers of illegitimate children). Recently, however, the Court has somewhat limited the scope of the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine. Weinberger
v. Salfi, by
95 University
S. Ct. 2457
(1975).School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
Published
of Missouri
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addressed the matter of irrebuttable presumptions against criminal-record1 68
vCtinms.
The state, as the party imposing the disability, is required to
establish the validity of the presumption in such cases.' 09 There is much
literature now available to argue for the invalidity of conclusive presumptions against criminal-record-victims. 170 This steadily expanding area of
constitutional law may prove to be extremely beneficial in future litigation by criminal-record-victims.
Employment restrictions may also be subjected to "direct relationship" or "rational connection" requirements imposed by the due process
clause. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners17 ' the Supreme Court reversed New Mexico's refusal to admit Schware to the bar because of his past
arrest record:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of... any...
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... [A]ny qualification must have a rational connection
72
with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.'

This test has been applied by both federal' 7 3 and state courts. 174 It has
yielded mixed results thus far in Missouri courts. The attacks have
usually been phrased in terms of "unreasonableness" and "arbitrariness"
rather than a "direct relationship" or "rational connection," but the conceptual framework has been the same. The Missouri Supreme Court, in
Liberman v. Cervantes, 75 upheld the validity of a St. Louis ordinance

requiring the Board of Police Commissioners to pass upon the "good
moral character" of the applicant before a pawnbroker's license could be
issued. It was found to be reasonable and non-arbitrary due to "the character of the business, which warrants stricter police regulation."170 In
Kehr v. Garrett 77 the St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
faced a challenge against an individual application of the statute, rather
than the statutorily imposed requirement itself. The court held that the
denial of a retail liquor-by-the-drink license because of the applicant's arrests which were in the remote past and which were not followed by convictions was "arbitrary and unreasonable. ' 17 A Missouri trial court held
168. Pordum v. Bd. of Regents, 491 F.2d 1281, 1287 n.14 (2d Cir. 1974).
169. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463 (1943).
170. See, e.g., D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM
(1964).
171. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
172. Id. at 238-39. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
173. See, e.g., Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1973); Pavone v. La.
State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 364 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. La. 1973).
174. See, e.g., Vielehr v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 187 (1973);
Miller v. District of Columbia Bd. of App. and Rev., 294 A.2d 365 (D.C. App. 1972).
175. 511 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1974).
176. Id. at 838, citing City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543, 554, 201
S.W. 870, 873 (Mo. 1918).
177. Kehr v. Garrett, 512 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
178. Id. at 194.
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that it was "arbitrary and unreasonable" for the Kansas City Department
of Liquor and Amusement Control to deny an occupational amusement
license to a 34-year-old applicant who had been convicted of second-degree
burglary in Pennsylvania at age 17.179 The direct relationship-rational
connection-unreasonableness-arbitrariness test, although resembling the supposedly foregone "substantive due process,"' 8 0 may thus be invoked to aid
a criminal-record-victim's challenge of a restrictive statute itself or of an
individual decision under the statute.
Procedural due process rights have been significantly clarified and
expanded by recent decisions. Procedural safeguards will apply if there
is a "substantial interest" in the loss of "liberty or property" which outweighs the inconvenience to the state.1 81 There is some support for the
view that the right to work is a basic liberty, the loss of which would constitute a grievous loss subject to due process safeguards.' 8 2 A federal court
of appeals has held that a person denied a driver's license due to his
"substantial criminal record" has sufficient interest in the license to require a statement of reasons for the refusal, a hearing, and publication of
the agency's procedural and substantive rules.' 8 3 In Missouri the Administrative Hearing Commission Act and the Administrative Procedure and
Review Act have rectified former deficiencies in the procedural due process
afforded by many administrative agencies,' 8 4 although several agencies
may still be open to attack for inadequate safeguards.' 8 5 Unfortunately,
Missouri decisions in this area still seem to dismiss lightly the criminalrecord-victims' procedural objections, often with such tautological reasoning as to fail in justifying or explaining their decision.' 80
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is a second major source of constitutional authority for the litigating criminalrecord-victim. A state action which treats persons differently is upheld only
if there is a rational basis' 8 7 for the action or, where fundamental constitutional rights are involved, if the interest to be protected is a compelling
179. H.M. Studios, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, Sixteenth Judicial Circuit
Court in Missouri, Division 4, Case No. 779756 (Sept. 4, 1975).
180. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
181. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971); Wisconsin -. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
182. See Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (dissenting
opinion). See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
183. Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (lst Cir. 1973).
184. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
185. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra.
186. An example is the following response to an alleged failure to give the
procedurally required "notice:"
The ordinance is not ... arbitrary, vague .. .[or] violative of the due
process clause, as contended. Specifically, the words . . . "good moral

character" are not so vague and indefinite as to violate due process of
law.
Liberman v. Cervantes, 511 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Mo. 1974).
187. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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state interest.' 8 8 The Burger Court has seemingly moved to an intermediate "means-focused" test, whereby the classification must bear a substantial relationship to the means for which the legislation is adopted.' 8 9
The unreasonable and unallowable classifications subject to invalidation
under an equal protection analysis will probably include some differentiations which are not absolute enough to be reviewed under the due
process irrebuttable presumption principles. 190 Furthermore, the equal
protection clause applies to any state action while the due process clause
applies only to state action which deprives persons of life, liberty, or
property. Such considerations make the equal protection approach a perferable one for criminal-record-victims.
The case of boxing champion Muhammad Ali exemplifies the equal
protection clause's wider applicability and greater relief. After being convicted of draft evasion, Ali was denied a license to box in New York. His
first challenge to that denial was based on the due process clause and it
was dismissed by the court. 19 ' Exercising his leave to amend, Ali changed
the basis of his argument to the equal protection clause and won. The
court found that the licensing authority's decision was "not based upon
differences that are reasonably related to the lawful purposes" of the regulatory powers involved. 192 More recently, a federal district court used the
reasonable means inquiry to invalidate an Iowa statute prohibiting employment of convicted felons in any civil service jobs.193 The court refused
to apply the "compelling interest" test based on either criminal records as
a "suspect classification" or the right to seek employment as a fundamental interest.' 94 Nevertheless, the statute was held to be unconstitutional
due to the impermissible means used by the state to implement its goals.
In dicta, the court stated that consideration should be given to the "nature
and seriousness of the crime in relation to the job sought ...

[t]he time

elapsing since the conviction, the degree of the felon's rehabilitation, and
the circumstances under which the crime was committed....

."15

A second

federal district court has adopted the same type of analysis to invalidate
a blanket exclusion of former heroin addicts from employment, holding
that the "ban . . . goes beyond any rational or legitimate needs of the
188. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
189. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model

for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rr.v. 1, 20 (1972).
190. See text accompanying notes 164-68 supra.

191. Ali v. Div. of State Athletic Commission of State of New York, 308
F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Ali's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in this case also claimed
violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and the free exercise of religion clause.
192. Ali v. Div. of State Athletic Commission of State of New York, 316 F.
Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
193. Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Ia. 1974).
194. Excellent arguments for criminal records as a suspect classification and
employment as a fundamental interest are contained in Comment, The Revolving
Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1403, 1420-22 (1975).

195. Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 581 (S.D. Ia. 1974).
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[employer], and excludes persons just as qualified for employment as
many who are hired.. ."196 Although Missouri criminal-record-victims
have not made extensive use of equal protection challenges, this would
seem to be a firm foundation for future litigation.
A third constitutional argument available to criminal-record-victims
is that unreasonable employment restrictions violate the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In Weems v. United
States,197 the Supreme Court held that the amendment forbids punishment which is disproportionate to the offense and invalidated a statute imposing disabilities beyond the pronounced sentence of incarceration:
His prison bars and chains are removed . . .but he goes from
them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept
under the shadow of his crime .. .he is subject to tormenting
regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls,
oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential
liberty.198
This aspect of the eighth amendment has been argued in criminal records

cases,1 99 but only rarely with success. 20 0 The eighth amendment has also
been held to proscribe punishment based on a person's "status" in society,2 01 but that principle has yet to be extended to unreasonable employment restrictions as punishment of the criminal-record-victim's status as
a record-holder. The difficulty in using the eighth amendment arises in
establishing the restrictions as "punishment;" therefore reliance on it is
not advisable.
The argument that criminal-record-victims are being excluded from

employment by an administrator working under an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power has less force in Missouri than any of the three
foregoing approaches. The usual requirement of strict legislative standards for the exercise of administrative discretion 20 2 has been held to yield
where the discretion relates to the administration of a police regulation
and is necessary to protect the public morals, health, safety and general
welfare and where personal fitness is a factor to be taken into considera
tion.2 03
The Missouri constitution contains its own due process dause2 04 and
its own clauses declaring "that all persons are created equal and are en196. Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1058
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
:197. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
198. Id. at 366.
199. All v. Div. of State Athletic Commission of State of New York, 308 F.
Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
200. People ex rel. Robison v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N.W. 21 (1888).
201. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
202. Clay v. City of St. Louis, 495 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
203. Milgram Food Stores, Inc. v. Ketchum, 384 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Mo. 1964);
State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, 326 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Ex parte
Williams, 345 Mo. 1121, 139 S.W.2d 485 (1940); State ex reL Mackey v. Hyde, 315
Mo. 681, 286 S.W. 363 (Mo. En Banc 1926).
204. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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titled to equal rights and opportunity under the law" 205 and that "cruel
and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted." 2 06 The cases construing
these cl auses contain some principles from which a criminal-record-victim
could argue his case,207 although there are not now any recorded instances
of such. state constitutional approaches being taken. Criminal-record-victims desiring a firm basis in constitutional law while wanting to be free
of binding precedent, should consider challenges founded on these clauses.
Statutory causes of actions based upon civil rights legislation can be
used as a supplement or alternative to a criminal-record-victim's constitutional claims, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, makes
it illegal for public or private employers:
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
of such individual's race,
affect his status as an employee, because
2 0
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 8

The Act has been held consistently to prohibit facially nondiscriminatory
practices and procedures which nevertheless tend to preserve or continue
the effects of past discrimination. The United States Supreme Court, in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 09 stated that:
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices.....
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation.... Where an employment practice perpetuates the effects of
good faith or abpast discriminatory procedures, the employer's 210
sence of discriminatory purpose is immaterial."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has so held
in an impressive list of cases which both pre-date and post-date Griggs.21 1
Some of the more unsavory aspects of America's social history have
produced a situation which insures the Act's extensive application to

criminal records cases: the disproportionate representation of minority
205. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
206. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 21.

207. See, e.g., Federal National Mortgage Association v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d
428 (1975) (due process); State v. Ewing, 518 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Mo. En Banc 1975)
(equal rights); State v. Neal, 514 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Mo. En Banc 1974) (cruel
and unusual punishment); State v. Kennedy, 513 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1974) (cruel and unusual punishment).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e)-2 (a) (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
209. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
210. Id. at 430-31.
211. See United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, Ford
Division, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone

Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int.
Ass'n, Local Union No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
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groups among criminal-record-victims. 2 12 This -circumstance results from
the relative poverty of those groups as well. as the selectively prejudicial
features of our criminal justice system. 213 Statistical demonstration of this
state of affairs is readily available, both for the nation' and for Missouri.

For example:
(1) Negroes constituted 26.7 percent of ill persons arrested in the
United States during 1974,214 though they represented only
11.1 percent of the national population in the 1970 census.21 5
(2) As of May, 1975, 47.8 percent of the inmates in the Missouri
State Penitentiary were black,216 while only 10.3
percent of
217
all Missourians in the 1970 census were black.

(3) One study has determined that Negro defendants in Missouri
have been found guilty by juries in 77 percent of their trials,
while white
defendants received guilty. verdicts in only 33
218
percent.
These data are evidentiary prerequisites for successfully challenging a
criminal records policy under Title VII, either through the administrative
processes of the EEOC2 19 or through court challenges. "Business necessity"
is the employer's only defense to a Title VII suit: "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited." 220 The Eighth Circuit has
held that the doctrine of business necessity "'connotes an irresistible de-

mand.' The system in question must not only fosier safety and efficiency,
but must be essential to that goal." 221 This strictness toward the employer
is complemented by an extremely liberal, sympathetic judicial attitude
toward the complainant. 222 These factors combine to make Title VII liti-

gation an area of unusually great promise for the aggrieved criminal-recordvictim.
A valuable precedent in the Title VII area is the decision in Gregory v.
212. See Note, Arrest Records, Hiring Practices, and Racial Discrimination,57
IowA L. R:Ev. 506 (1971).
213. See Wolfgang and Cohen, The Convergence of Race and Crime, in RAcE,
CRIME, AND JusTlE 74 (C. Reasons and J. Kuykendall eds. 1972).
214. FEDERAL BuRFAu OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME R PoRTs-1974,
Table 38 at 191 (1975).
215. UNITED STATEs DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATiSIcAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITE
STATrEs-1973, Table 24 at 25 (1973).
•
216. Letter from George M. Camp, Deputy Director, Missouri Department of
Social Services, to Deverne Galloway, Missouri State Representative, July 21, 1975.
217. R. CAMPBELL AND T. BAKER, NEGRoES IN Missouva, Table 1 at 3 (1974).
218. Gerard & Terry, DiscriminationAgainst Negroes in the Administration of
Criminal Law in Missouri, 1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. 415, 431, 436.
219. See notes 142-48 and accompanying text supra.
220. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
221. United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973) (emphasis in original). For criminal
records cases where the court found for the employer on the basis of business
necessity, see Lester v. Ellis Trucking Co.,
F. Supp. (W.D. Tenn.

1975); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971),
afrFd mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
222. Dent & Martin, Multiple Remedies for Employment Discrimination:How
Many Bites at the Apple?, 16 S. Tux. L.J. 57 (1974).
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Litton Systems, Inc. 22 3 In that case an employer was restrained from using
arrest records in hiring decisions on the groufid that the effect would be
to discriminate against black applicants. Central to the opinion was the
court's finding that the arrest records bore no relationship to job performance. 224 The first indication of the possible unacceptability of using
conviction records, came in Carter v. Gallagher,25 where the Eighth Circuit held that an employer "at a minimum should not treat conviction as
'226
an absolute bar to employment.
The Eighth Circuit has since issued an opinion which will extend
even greater Title VII protection to the criminal-record-victim. In Green
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company227 the court reversed district court
findings of non-discriminatory impact and business necessity in the defendant's absolute policy of refusing consideration for employment to
any person convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic offense. 22 8 After
carefully reviewing the relevant decisions, the court held:
[A] sweeping disqualification for employment resting solely on
past behavior can violate Title VII where that employment pracracial impact and rests upon a tenuous
tice has a disproportionate
229
or insubstantial basis.
We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place every individual convicted of any offense, except
a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the unemployed.

This is particularly true for blacks who have suffered and still
suffer from the burdens of discrimination in our society. To deny
job opportunities to these individuals because of some conduct
which may be remote in time or does not significantly bear upon
the particular job requirements is an unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden.2 3 0
The strong wording of the Green decision has significantly eased the
criminal-record-victim's burden in establishing his Title VII cause of action.
Green and its precursors represent major steps toward eliminating the defacto discrimination caused by employers' use of criminal records cri23
teria. 1
Criminal-record-victims have also started to capitalize upon the relief
available under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, now referred to as
223. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d
631 (9th Cir. 1972).
224. Id. at 402-03.
225. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). This
case involved 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, but it relied heavily upon a Title VII
analysis and the decision in Griggs.
226. Id. at 326.
227. .523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
228. Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 381 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
229. Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1296 (8th Cir. 1975).
230. Id. at 1298.
231. The important question whether white criminal-record-victims can bring,
or benefit from, Title VII suits has riot yet been answered. See Green v. Missouri
Pacific R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1299 (8th Cir. 1975).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/9
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sections 1981 and 1983.232 The federal courts of appeals have held that
these Acts prohibit racial discrimination in private as well as public employment.23 8 Most courts now allow an individual to pursue a claim under
these provisions even though he has not pursued his Title VII remedy.23.
Criminal-record-victims recovering under ,these provisionsi though, have
generally had to establish the same elements required for a Title VII
28 5
cause of action.

There seems to be a single test that emerges from these several judicial
remedies, regardless of whether a constitutional or statutory cause of action
is alleged by the criminal-record-victim; Although the strictness of the test
varies,-it is basically this: the criminal records employment restriction is
unreasonable and illegal unless it bears a "direct relationship" or has a
"rational connection" to the job performance. The :"business necessity"
formula is merely a more rigid expression of the same standard. The
criminal-record-victim is really asking for nothing more than this type of
fair judgment on the merits.
D. Legislative Remedies
Legislative remedies may be the most immediately inaccessible and
yet the most eventually beneficial of all relief for criminal-record-victims.
Previous sections of this comment have discussed the need for legislative
revisions in the areas of record expungement and administrative agencies'
organization and powers. This section deals with the need for new legislation to deal with the matter of employer discrimination itself. All of
these legislative suggestions are made with a desire to simplify the remedial alternatives available to the criminal-record-victim. Any legislation
proposed should be designed to reduce costs to the criminal-record-victim
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes tO be subjected,
any citizens of the United States or other person with the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other property proceeding for redress.
233. Young v. International Telephone and Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d
Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International
Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
234. Dent, supra note 221, at 89.
235. See, e.g., Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 399 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Paul v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (U.S. March 23, 1976)
where an accused shoplifter, against whom charges had been dismissed, was denied
relief under § 1983 against police chiefs who included him in an "active shoplifter"
flyer because of his failure to demonstrate resultant employment discrimination.
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through more simple, less litigious remedies, and to free the courts from
the "legal pollution" of cases without merit.23 6 Any legislation passed
should generally insure that the criminal-record-victim will have "far
greater access to and general use of dispute-resolving mechanisms." 28 7
Some state legislatures have recently enacted remedial measures of
benefit to the criminal-record-victim. Florida238 and Illinois2 390 were early
leaders in the abolition of blanket civil service and licensing restrictions.
A conviction in those states may disqualify only if it relates to the position
of employment sought or to the specific work for which a license is sought.
Twelve other states have now passed similar legislation, removing -nanda-

tory employment- restrictions barring the entry of criminal-record-victims
into licensed occupations and,'in most cases, public employment. 2 40.Hawaii,
however, is the' only 'state which has, statutorily acted to eliminate unreasonable restrictions on criminal-record-victim employment in both the
public and private -sectors. In 1974 the state legislature amended; its Employment Practices Law to include "arrest and court record (s)" among
the other, more traditional elements of unallowable discrimination.2 41
The Hawaii statute explicitly prohibits unreasonable discrimination based
on criminal, records,, thereby obviating the necessity for the sometimes
strained argument which equates such discrimination with racial discrimination. This.has -the added advantage of eliminating any question as
to what race or color the. plaintiff, must be. The statute grants enforcement

authority to an- already existent state administrative agency,24 2 thereby
1 236. Ehrlich, Legai Pollution is Stifling the Court System, The Kansas City
Star, February 22, 1976, at 23A.
237. L. Nader and L. Singer, Dispute. Resolution in the Future: What are the
Choices? 3 (19.75) ,(Paper prepared for a Conference sponsored by the State Bar
of California, Sept '12-14, 1975).
238. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011 (Supp. 1974).
239. ILL. UNIFORM CODE OF CoRREGrIoNs' § 525-5 (1972).
240. Arkansas,' California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington.
National Clearinghouse on :Offender Employment Restrictions, 12 OFFENDER
EMPLOYMENT R'E"VIEw .1 '(1975). Among the strongest of these statutes is CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-610 (Supp. 1975), as amended, Pub, Act No. 74-265, Conn. Legis.
z
Serv. (1974).
241. HAwAII REv. STAT. § 378-2 (1) (1975 Supp.) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination: (1)
For an employer to refuse to-hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, any 'individual because of his race, sex, age, Yeligion color, ancestry, physical 'handicap, .or arrest and court record which does not have
a substantial -relationship to the function's and responsibilities of the prospective or continued empl6yment, provided that an employer may re" fuse to hire an individual for'good capse relating to the ability of the:
individual to perform'the 'ork in question ....
The statute also contains'a comprehensive definition of the records involved:
"Arrest and court records" incliide any information about an individual
having been questioned, apprehended, taken into custody or detention,
held for investigation,'charged -ith an offense, served a summons, arrested
-with or without a 'wairatit, -tried, or convicted pursuant to any' law en• forcement or niilitary authority.
Id. at § 378-1 (6):

*

.

242. HAwAir REv. STAT. § 378-3 (1975 Supp.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/9

30

1976]

Kurtz: Kurtz: Employment of Criminal-Record
CRIMINAL-RECORD-VICTIMS

making remedies more accessible to indigent criminal-record-victims. It incorporates the "direct relationship-rational connection" test, which is the
prevailing constitutional standard.2 43 It also reduces the law on criminal
records discrimination to simple, understandable provisions. Finally, it
seems actually to have resulted in greater respect for the rights of criminal244
record-victims and a workable method for vindicating those rights.
There are several model statutes and legislative suggestions that have
been published in recent years. The Georgetown University Law Center has
drafted a "Model Trade Licensing Statute" dealing with "disqualifications
of applicants with criminal records." 245 The proposal would prohibit any
automatic "bars,"2 46 proscribe consideration of certain criminal records, 24

and mandate a direct relationship test.2 48 The Georgetown University Law
Center has also drafted a "Model Civil Service Criminal Conviction
Statute," which would require both a direct relationship test and the consideration of the criminal-record-victim's "rehabilitation" 249 in civil service
employment. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code proposes a
direct relationship test for all job qualifications. 250 Finally, the American
243. See notes 173-74 and accompanying text supra.
244. Letter from Charles Mitsuyama, Fair Employment Specialist, Enforcement Division, Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, to author
of this comment, January 16, 1976:
Since the enactment of the law that makes it unlawful to discriminate in
employment on the basis of a person's arrest and court record, 12 complaints have been filed with our agency. Four of the complaints were
withdrawn because the complainants were reinstated with back wages and
three were dosed due to no response by the complainants; one complaint
was dismissed as being untimely filed, and four complaints are pending
investigation.
245. J. HUNT, J. BOWERS, AND N. MILLER, LAws, LICENSE , AND THE OFFENDER'S
RIGHT TO Woan Appendix B (1974).

246. Id. at Appendix B, § 2 (a).
247. ,Id. at Appendix B, § 2 (b):
The following criminal records shall not be used, distributed or disseminated in connection with an application for a permit, registratiofi, -license or certificate: (1) Records of arrest not followed by a valid conviction; (2) Convictions which have been (annulled or expunged); (3)
Misdemeanor convictions not involving moral turpitude; and (4) Misdemeanor convictions for which no jail sentence can be imposed.
248. Id. at Appendix B, § 3.

249. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON OFFENDER EMPLOYMTENT RESTRICIONS, ExPANDING GovRNmEr JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR Ex-OF-ENDE11S 12 (1973) contains
this model statute:
No person with a criminal conviction record shall be disqualified from
taking open competitive examinations to test the relative fitness of applicants for the respective positions. Persons with criminal conviction records shall be entitled to the benefit of all rules and regulations pertaining

to the grading and processing of job applications which are accorded to
other applicants. In considering persons with criminal conviction records
who have applied for employment the hiring official shall consider the

following: (a) The nature of the crime and its relationship to the job
for which the person has applied; (b)Information pertaining to the degree of rehabilitation of the convicted person; and (c) The time elapsed
since the conviction.
250. ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.1 (1) (1962) provides in part:

No person shall suffer any legal disqualification or disability because of
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Bar Association's National Clearinghouse on Offender Employment Restrictions has issued several important publications outlining the steps to
be taken in legislative attacks upon unreasonable employment restrictions
confronting criminal-record-victims. 2 51 Despite the virtues of these various
formulations, however, none achieve the same levels of simplicity and comprehensiveness as does the Hawaii statute.
The Missouri General Assembly has recently considered several remedial proposals concerning employment restrictions on criminal-recordvictims, but none has been passed. One measure would have required
governmental licensing authorities themselves to evaluate the direct relationship and rehabilitation elements:
The board or other agency may consider the conviction as some
evidence of an absence of good moral character, but shall also consider the nature of the crime committed in relation to the license
which the applicant seeks, the date of the conviction, the conduct
of the applicant since the date of the conviction and other evi2 52
dence as to the applicant's character.
A more specific bill would have prohibited the Supervisor of Liquor Control from acting adversely upon a license application, suspension, renewal,
or revocation solely due to a felony conviction, unless the conviction occurred within the immediately preceding five years.2 53 A more general
bill would have provided that all of a felon's civil disabilities cease automatically upon his discharge by the Department of Corrections. 254 The
Missouri Proposed Criminal Code contains the same comprehensive provision on the direct relationship requirement2 55 that was included in the
Model Penal Code. 256 The culmination of a licensing study by the Young
Lawyers' Section of The Missouri Bar 257 was the introduction of "an act
concerning the effect of criminal conviction on eligibility for public emhis conviction of a crime or his sentence on such conviction, unless the disqualification or disability involves the deprivation of a right or privilege
which is- . . provided by the judgment, order, or regulation of a court,
agency or official exercising a jurisdiction conferred by law, or by the
statute defining such jurisdiction, when the commission of the crime or
the conviction or the sentence is reasonably related to the competency of
the individual to exercise the right or privilege of which he is deprived.
251. See, e.g., NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT REsTRIcTIONS, REMOVING OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RETRIcrIONs: A HANDBOOK ON REMEDIAL
LEGISLATION AND OTHER TECHNIQUES FOR ALLEVIATING FORMAL EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS CONFRONTING EX-OFFENDERS

(2d ed. 1973);

NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON

OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS, GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE ACTION: A REVIEW
OF STRATEGIES To REMOVE STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON OFFENDER JOB OPrORTUNI-

TIES (undated).

252. H.B. 43, 78th (Mo.) Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975).
253. H.B. 52, 78th (Mo.) Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975).
254. H.B. 53, 78th (Mo.) Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975). See also H.B.
990, 78th (Mo.) Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
255. Comm. TO DRAFr A MODERN CRIMINAL CODE, THE PROPOSED CRIMINAL
CODE FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI § 6.010 (1973). See S.B. 735, 78th (Mo.) Gen.
Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
256. See note 250 and accompanying text supra.
257. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
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ployment or right to obtain business or professional certification, license,

permit, or registration."258 The proposal was basically similar to the Georgetown University Law Center models,25 9 and provided in part:
No person shall be denied public employment nor shall a person
be disqualified from pursuing, practicing, or engaging in any occupation for which a license is required solely because of a prior
conviction of a crime, unless the crime directly relates to the
position or occupation sought and the person is unable to show
competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation
and present fitness
for the position or occupation sought.260
The bill specified the evidentiary considerations and the duties of the
licensing authority. It would appear to provide much more protection than
the Administrative Hearing Commission 261 could for the criminal-recordvictim involved with a licensing body.
None of these proposals has yet been passed by the Missouri General
Assembly, despite recent, specific encouragement for such action.2 62 The
state of Hawaii has enacted an exemplary statute with the simplicity and
comprehensiveness that can bring justice to the problem considered here.
Missouri legislators have rejected several more complex, less sweeping,
but still worthy proposals. Until persistent, diligent legislative attention
is given to the matter of unreasonable restrictions on criminal-record- victim employment in Missouri, the state's criminal-record-victims will continue to suffer from unemployment and underemployment, and the
state's citizenry will continue to suffer from higher crime rates and
higher criminal justice costs.
IV. CONCLUSION

Persons who have acquired a "criminal record" sometime during their
lives are being regularly restricted in their search for public and private
employment in the state of Missouri. Many of these "criminal-record-victims" are deserving individuals who need jobs desperately if they are to
lead crime-free lives. Some of the employment restrictions they encounter
are reasonable and fair, but too many are not. Too many do not bear a
"direct relationship" or "rational connection" to the work involved; too
many are not justified by any "business necessity." Criminal records retention policies and laws in Missouri need to be changed so that criminalrecord-victims have at least some chance to avoid the life sentence of a
stigmaticr ecord. In the meantime, they should have some means to challenge unreasonable employment restrictions brought on by the existence
258.,
259.
260.
261.
262.

H.B. 1762, 78th (Mo.) Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
See notes 24549 and accompanying text supra.
H.B. 1762, 78th (Mo.) Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
See notes 128-31 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Mo. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY, MissouRi AcTION PLAN FOR PUBLIC
SAFETY 6 (1976):
[Standard) 2.3 It is recommended that the Missouri General Assembly
repeal those statutes .

.

. which place restrictions on civil liberties, em-

ployment and licensing opportunities of ex-offenders.
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